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Recent Decisions
Criminal Law - Circumstantial Evidence Of Corpus
Delicti Held Sufficient For Murder Conviction. People v.
Scott, 1 Cal. Reptr. 600 (1959). The California District Court
of Appeal, in affirming a first degree murder conviction,
held that, despite the lack of a corpse or any part thereof,
the circumstantial evidence introduced in the trial was
sufficient to supply proof of guilt so convincing as to preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is
apparently the first United States decision where a murder
conviction has been upheld without a body, or any part
thereof, having been found. The defendant, by his behavior following the disappearance of his wife, indicated
that her absence had not been voluntary and that he had
knowledge of her death after her disappearance. The Court
noted that murder convictions, under similar circumstances,
have been upheld in the English cases of The King v. Horry,
[1952] N.Z.L.R. 111, 68 L.Q. Rev. 391 (1952), and The King
v. Onufrejczk, 1 Q.B. 388, 33 Can. B. Rev. 603 (1955).
In order to sustain a murder conviction, there must be
proof of the corpus delicti of the crime, which includes
proof that a human life has been taken. This is usually
satisfied by direct evidence of the fact of death, but there
is no bar in theory to circumstantial proof. Such proof
is in fact sometimes the only kind likely to be available.
See St. Clairv. United States, 154 U. S. 134 (1894) (Throwing victim overboard on the high seas), and 159 A.L.R.
524 (Infanticide). See also 26 Am. Jur. 475, Sec. 461, for
general discussion of necessity of proof of corpus delicti.
The circumstantial evidence of death must, of course, be
clear and satisfactory.
Maryland courts have never been confronted with the
problem. In Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 177 A. 2d 549
(1955), and Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 52 A. 2d 484
(1946), the Court of Appeals indicated that proof of corpus
delicti is sufficient if it is established that the person for
whose death the prosecution was instituted is dead, and
that the death occurred under circumstances which would
indicate that it was caused criminally. However, both of
these cases involved the identity of the corpse rather than
the lack of one.
Evidence - Admissibility, In A Rape Trial, Of Testimony Of Defendant's Prior Rape Victims. State v. Finley,
85 Ariz. 327, 338 P. 2d 790 (1959). Based on admission
of testimony of a 17-year-old girl that the defendant had
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raped her five days before raping the prosecutrix, the defendant was convicted of raping the 44-year-old prosecutrix, where in both instances the defendant had bluntly
declared his intentions, proceeded to accomplish same with
brute force in parked automobiles at night and had exhibited a personality transformation of the "Dr. JekyllMr. Hyde" variety. The Supreme Court of Arizona in a
3-2 decision affirmed the conviction, finding the facts sufficient to establish a scheme or design and in addition, reinforced their holding by indicating that rape is the type
of sexual offense where, for the purpose of showing
"criminal desires" and "lustful propensities", evidence of
prior rapes may be admissible. The dissent, relying heavily
on Lovely v. United States, 169 F. 2d 386 (4th Cir., 1948),
refused to include rape among the sex offenses where
greater liberality is exercised, and required that for the
"common scheme" exception to apply, evidence of the
prior offense must establish a preconceived plan which
resulted in the commission of that crime, reasoning that a
prior rape merely having certain elements in common
with the rape for which the accused was on trial has no
tendency to establish a plan or design such as would render
the evidence admissible.
Although Maryland has no decision on this precise
point, dictum in Wentz v. State, 159 Md. 161, 164, 150 A.
278 (1930), indicates that in "sexual offenses", especially
adultery, bigamy, criminal conversation, sodomy, indecent
liberties, and incest there is a well recognized exception to
the general rule, but limits this exception to prior offenses
against prosecutrix. In the Wentz case since the previous
incestuous act was against the prosecutrix's sister, such
testimony was excluded. In Berger v. State, 179 Md. 410,
20 A. 2d 146 (1941) evidence of a prior act of sodomy, and
in Blake v. State, 210 Md. 459, 124 A. 2d 273 (1956) testimony of previous unnatural sex acts were excluded because they were committed against persons other than the
prosecutrix. See also, 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (3rd ed.
1940), § 357; 167 A.L.R. 594; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954),
§ 157.
Maryland Industrial Finance Law - What Constitutes
Error Of Computation. Fisher v. Bethesda Discount Corporation, 221 Md. 271, 157 A. 2d 265 (1960). Plaintiff's loan
payment became due on Friday, but was not paid until the
following Wednesday. Defendant loan company, unaware
of the Time Statute, 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 94, § 2, which
excludes Sunday in computing a period of seven days or
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less, collected a $2.68 delinquency charge from plaintiff.
Collection of a delinquency charge is authorized by the
Maryland Industrial Finance Law, 1 MD. CODE (1957) Art.
11, § 196 (A) (3), for any default continuing for five or
more days. The defendant contended that the collection of
the delinquency charge, while admittedly erroneous, was
done as "the result of an accidental or bona fide error of
computation." Unless the defendant's error met this test,
the defendant would lose his right to collect the entire loan
under Sec. 196(c) of the Finance Law. In reversing the
lower court's judgment for the defendant, the Court of
Appeals held that the collection of the overcharge was not
an "error of computation" and consequently the entire loan
of $800 was void and uncollectible. The Court pointed out
that the Finance Law plainly excuses errors as to the
honest miscalculation of interest, as the result of a computation, but does not excuse a mistake of law as to what,
legally, may be collected. Although the Court felt that the
situation at hand did not, technically, involve usury, it
nevertheless applied usury principles in arriving at its
final decision.
The authorities on the subject indicate that where there
is an exaction of more than legal interest resulting from an
honest mistake of fact, there is no usury; but that a mistake as to the law will not ordinarily relieve a transaction
from being usurious, 55 AM. JuR. 349, 350, Usury, Sec. 35;
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(Rev. ed. 1938) § 1698. It appears

harsh to hold, on the one hand that a mistake of fact,
such as an error in the calculation of interest or a clerical
error, does not constitute usury, and on the other, that a
similar error, as in this instance a mistake of law, though
admittedly an "honest error" is in effect usurious. For a
comprehensive historical sketch of usury and the problems
involved, see Plitt v. Kaufman, 188 Md. 606, 53 A. 2d 673
(1946), and Finance Company, Inc. v. Catterton, 161 Md.
650, 653, 158 A. 17 (1931).
Negligence - Assumption Of Risk By Golf Course Employee. Meding v. Robinson, 157 A. 2d 254 (Del. 1959).
Plaintiff, a greenskeeper who was standing on the edge of
the green approximately seven feet from the pin, was
injured when defendant's approach shot from ninety yards
out hit him. The Court, finding that defendant did not
give the normal admonitory warning held that a greenskeeper did not assume the risk of the golfer's act. A golfer
has the duty of giving timely and adequate warning to
those in the general intended line of play.
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Because of the known dangers incident to the game of
golf, players, spectators and employees assume the risk
of injury due to accident or inadvertence, unaccompanied
by negligence, Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471,
157 A. 10 (1931). However, before driving, a player must
warn persons who are in the general line of play and who
are unaware of his intention to play. The word "fore" is
recognized by golfers the world over as the appropriate
and adequate warning cry, Alexander v. Wren, 158 Va.
486, 164 S.E. 715 (1932). But such a warning need not
be made if the subsequent injured party was in a safe place
or knew of the intended play, Boynton v. Ryan, 257 F. 2d
70 (3rd Cir., 1958), Walsh v. Machlin, 128 Conn. 412, 23 A.
2d 156, 138 A.L.R. 538 (1941).
The Maryland Court of Appeals apparently has not been
presented with any similar type situations. For a thorough
review of decisions from other jurisdictions, see 138 A.L.R.
541, 7 A.L.R. 2d 704.
Practice - Length Of Time During Which Jury Is Kept
Together Is Within The Discretion Of The Trial Judge.
Commonwealth V. Moore, 157 A. 2d 65 (Pa. 1959). Defendant, appealing from a conviction of voluntary manslaughter, bases her appeal on the grounds that the decision
of the jury reached under undue strain and duress imposed upon the jurors by the failure of the trial judge to
make provisions for them to rest and sleep during an extensive deliberation period. After having received instructions, the jury retired at 7:08 P.M. During the next
eleven hours they recessed from deliberating only twice,
the first time at 11:15 when they asked for and received
further instructions from the judge, and the second at
5:00 A.M. in the morning when the judge called them back
into the court room for the purpose of answering any
questions which the jurors might have so as to enable
them to reach a verdict. The forelady at this time expressed the opinion that the jury was deadlocked, but the
judge sent the jurors back into deliberation and urged
them to make every effort to reach a unanimous decision.
At 6:08 A.M., a little more than an hour later, the jury
returned with the verdict. In affirming the conviction the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held the extent of time
during which a jury shall be kept together is entirely
within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his action
will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. In light
of the facts stated above and due to the fact that the jury
at no time made any requests for the suspension of the
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deliberations, the Court felt that there was no abuse of
judiciary discretion in this case.
Maryland, in addition to many other states, is in accord with the rule laid down by the Pennsylvania Court.
In Brigmon v. Warden, 213 Md. 628, 131 A. 2d 245 (1957),
the Court of Appeals, in denying an application for a writ
of habeas corpus stated that the length of time that a
jury should be required to deliberate upon a defendant's
guilt or innocence lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court.
For an interesting annotation on this point, see 8 A.L.R.
1420 et seq.
Real Property - Taking Of Air Easements By Landings
And Take-Offs Of Aircraft. Ackerman v. Port of Seattle,
348 P. 2d 664 (Wash. 1960). In an action by landowners
adjacent to a large commercial airport to recover for
diminution in market value of their land due to repeated
low flights of aircraft in take-offs and landings, the Supreme
Court of Washington held that such flights were not within
public domain of navigable airspace as set out by Congress
in Civil Air Regulations, and thus amounted to a taking of
air easements, for which landowners are compensable.
The Court relied on United States v. Causby, 328 U. S.
256 (1946), in differentiating between the police power
of the government and the right of eminent domain. Both
Courts said that state governments cannot simply arbitrarily declare that all airspace over a private land is
public domain, and thereby avoid paying damages to property owners for use of such airspace by the state. Only
air above minimum navigable airspace altitudes is part of
the public domain, and repeated invasions of airspace below this minimum is a "taking" of an air easement, compensable under the Washington State Constitution as the
taking of private property for public use under the power
of eminent domain.
Maryland has followed this rule in Mutual Chemical Co.
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Circuit Court of
Baltimore City, Daffy Record, Jan. 27, 1939, the only case
of this type in this state to date. In this case, a prior
Maryland statute was held invalid. In 1949, a new statute
was enacted (1 Md. Code (1957) Art. 1A, Sec. 13(d))
requiring air rights necessary for a public airport to be
acquired by condemnation proceedings under the right of
eminent domain. For a further analysis of this area, see
Aviators Right in Airspace, 8 Md. L. Rev. 300 (1944).

